Updating the International Monetary System to Respond to Current Global Challenges: Can It Happen Within the Existing Legal Framework? by Caliari, Aldo
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2011
Updating the International Monetary System to
Respond to Current Global Challenges: Can It
Happen Within the Existing Legal Framework?
Aldo Caliari
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Caliari, Aldo, "Updating the International Monetary System to Respond to Current Global Challenges: Can It Happen Within the
Existing Legal Framework?" (2011). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 355.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/355
CALIARI - Final Version 5/6/2011 12:06 PM 
 
588 
Updating the International Monetary 
System to Respond to Current Global 
Challenges: Can It Happen Within the 
Existing Legal Framework?1 
Aldo Caliari* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The global economic crisis of 2008–09 triggered the most 
intense debate about the international monetary system that 
the world has seen in the last four decades. As a result, 
international policy-makers from both developed and developing 
countries, intergovernmental organizations as well as business 
sector leaders and prominent academics have proposed a 
number of reforms to prevent future crisis. 
It is likely that some of the reforms can be introduced 
without significant revisions to the IMF Articles of Agreement. 
However, part of the debate revolves around the adequacy of the 
existing legal framework regarding the global monetary system.  
In this regard, the principles and provisions surrounding the 
roles of the US dollar and the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in 
the global reserve system envisioned in the 1960s may prove too 
limited a framework to allow for reforms that can adequately 
respond to current and acute challenges. 
A first challenge is to foster an orderly exit from global 
monetary imbalances. A second challenge is to reduce currency 
volatility, with its consequent negative implications for trade 
flows. The third challenge is to create a mechanism for more 
symmetric adjustments between surplus and deficit countries, 
while avoiding recessionary impacts. Finally, as development 
 
 1. Paper prepared for ASIL International Economic Law Interest Group 
Biennial Conference: International Economic Law in a Time of Change: 
Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions, 
November 18- November 20, 2010, University of Minnesota Law School, 
Minnesota, United States. 
* LL.M, MIPP. Director, Rethinking Bretton Woods Project, Center of Concern. 
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and climate finance needs continue to grow, the potential of the 
SDRs to provide development finance may no longer be an item 
that can be sidelined from the debate. 
This paper is organized in the following way. The next 
section introduces the main legal provisions in the IMF Articles 
of Agreement that set the functioning of the global reserve 
system. The second section provides a brief survey of the 
systemic monetary issues raised by the recent Great Recession. 
The third section outlines a number of reform proposals, where 
they are being discussed, and the challenges that such reforms 
may potentially face. The final section assesses the proposals 
from the standpoint of the four challenges mentioned above and 
seeks to respond to whether and to what extent existing legal 
provisions can or cannot accommodate changes that respond to 
such challenges. In this process, an outline of areas where legal 
reform may be required will emerge.  
II. ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE MONETARY SYSTEM 
RAISED BY THE GREAT RECESSION 
In 2008–09, the world economy experienced what has been 
characterized as the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression in the 1930s.2 
As a result of the crisis, a debate has emerged on the 
necessary reforms of the international financial system. The 
international monetary system has been part of that debate, as 
the Great Recession has strengthened a sense of urgency among 
policymakers about the need to address its shortfalls. 
From a monetary perspective, the main concern raised by 
the crisis has been the tendency of a system in which the US 
dollar is the dominant reserve and trading currency to generate 
ever-growing imbalances between countries with trade 
surpluses and those with deficits. 
It is not the place of this paper to analyze in depth the role 
that global imbalances played in the crisis. Suffice to say, in the 
words of Canadian Central Bank Governor, Mark Carney: 
 
 2. See, e.g., R. Baqir et al., How did emerging Markets Cope in the Crisis?, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) (2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np
/pp/eng/2010/061510.pdf (stating that, “[g]rowth of the global economy fell 6 
percentage points from its pre-crisis peak to its trough in 2009, the biggest 
shock in the post-war era.” These developments marked the end of the boom 
years of the mid-2000s, with the world economy suddenly thrown into the Great 
Recession). 
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While there were many causes of the crisis, its intensity and scope 
reflected unprecedented disequilibria. Large and unsustainable 
current account imbalances across major economic areas were integral 
to the buildup of vulnerabilities in many asset markets. In recent 
years, the international monetary system failed to promote timely and 
orderly economic adjustment.3 
A number of different analysts have come to concur that the 
use of the domestic currency of a country as principal means of 
payments in international transactions and as a store of value 
generates what has been characterized as the “Triffin dilemma.” 
For instance, the Commission of Experts of the President of 
the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System (UN Commission), a 
commission set up by President of the General Assembly in late 
2008 and chaired by Nobel Prize-winner economist Joseph 
Stiglitz, stated: 
One of the main problems of the Bretton Woods system was identified 
by Robert Triffin in the 1950s: the use of a national currency (the US 
dollar) as the international reserve currency. This generated a difficult 
dilemma since the dollar deficits necessary to increase global liquidity 
eroded confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency and created doubt 
about the ability of the U.S. to maintain dollar-gold parity. 
Abandonment of dollar convertibility and the acceptance of flexible 
exchanges rates eliminated some of these problems but at the same 
time created new ones. Instead of uncertainty over the ability to 
maintain dollar-gold parity, the “Triffin dilemma” has been reflected in 
large swings in U.S. current account imbalances and associated 
volatility of the dollar exchange rate and, in the long-run, with the risk 
of loss in the value of foreign exchange reserves held in dollars as U.S. 
external deficits increased.4 
In brief, the “Triffin dilemma” is the tendency of a system 
 
 3. See Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada, Remarks to the 
Foreign Policy Association: The Evolution of the International Monetary 
System (Nov. 19, 2009). See also Ignazio Visco, Deputy Director General of the 
Bank of Italy, Paper to the Global Economic Symposium: The Global Crisis—
the Role of Policy and the International Monetary System (March, 2009) 
(“Distorted incentives, inadequate risk management and lax supervision 
encouraged the financial sector to take increasingly large, poorly understood 
risk exposures, financed through high leverage and a growing reliance on 
wholesale short-term funding. However, it is unlikely that all this would have 
developed to the same extent had the macroeconomic environment not been 
characterized by low interest rates, rising asset prices and large saving-
investment imbalances in the United States and, with opposite sign, in Asia 
and the oil producing countries.”). 
 4. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., THE STIGLITZ REPORT: REFORMING THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN THE WAKE OF THE 
GLOBAL CRISIS 157 (The New Press 2010). 
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towards excess demand for the currency of the reserve issuer. 
This demand makes it easy for the issuing country to finance a 
trade deficit, which, if left to grow unchecked, eventually 
undermines confidence in the currency as a store of value. 
Eventually countries who hold the currency find themselves 
trapped. Since any attempt to diversify their holdings away 
from the currency would necessarily force them to first intensify 
their holdings of it, such a strategy results in further increases 
in excess demand for the currency, fueling a vicious circle.5 
An ancillary concern with the use of a domestic currency as 
an international reserve currency is the way that global 
monetary decisions end up left to factors related to the reserve 
issuing country’s domestic policy and other idiosyncratic 
features.6 
 
 5. See Jose Antonio Ocampo, Why Should the Global Reserve System be 
Reformed? 2 (January 2010) (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Dialogue on 
Globalization Briefing Paper) (“Prior to the current crisis, the most pressing 
con-cerns were the weakening of the dollar and escalating U.S. net liabilities 
with the rest of the world, as part of a broader problem of global payments 
imbalances.”); Isabelle Mateos y Lago, Paper Presented at the KDI/IMF 
Conference on Reconstructing the World Economy: The Debate on the 
International Monetary System 6 (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/n
p/seminars/eng/2010/kdi/pdf/ims.pdf (“Key risks are deflationary bias if too few 
reserves are provided or accumulation of an unsustainable debt overhang if too 
many are (the “Triffin dilemma,” which was originally developed in a world 
with few cross-border capital flows, but still lives today, albeit in a different 
form, . . . ).”); McKinsey Global Institute, An Exorbitant Privilege? Implications 
of Reserve Currencies for Competitiveness n.17 (Dec. 2009) (Discussion Paper) 
(“This is analogous, in some ways, to Triffin’s dilemma . . . the intuition that 
because the reserve currency issuer has to provide liquidity to the global 
system by issuing debt denominated in its currency, eventually the pressure to 
provide additional debt will undermine the sustainability of the reserve 
currency issuer. This may place the system under significant pressure and 
perhaps even cause it to break down.”); Zhou Xiaochuan, Zhou Xiaochuan’s 
Statement on Reforming the International Monetary System, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/china/zhou-xiaochuans-
statement-reforming-international-monetary-system/p18916 (“The Triffin 
Dilemma, i.e., the issuing countries of reserve currencies cannot maintain the 
value of the reserve currencies while providing liquidity to the world, still 
exists.”). 
 6. IMF, Reserve Accumulation and International Monetary Stability, 10 
(Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter IMF, Reserve Accumulation] (“Reserves 
concentration in the government debt of one country introduces idiosyncratic 
risks to the IMS stemming from conditions and policy in that country. Policies 
designed to meet domestic concerns typically do not consider effects on the 
wider world (e.g., a loose monetary policy may be warranted for domestic 
stability purposes, and yet induce unwanted demand at the global level). 
Moreover, the system is left vulnerable to policy mistakes, or private sector 
excesses, in the core economies.”). See also STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 113 (“A 
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III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The legal framework for the international monetary system 
is established by a number of provisions in the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. While this 
section does not intend to enumerate them exhaustively, it will 
refer to those that are of interest in light of the analysis and 
arguments that follow. 
Art. I identifies the purposes for the International Monetary 
Fund: 
To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent 
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and 
collaboration on international monetary problems. 
To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international  
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of 
high levels of employment and real income and to the development of 
the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of 
economic policy. 
     To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange 
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange 
depreciation. 
     To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments 
in respect of current transactions between members and in the 
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth 
of world trade. 
     To give confidence to members by making the general resources of 
the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, 
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in 
their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity. 
     In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen 
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments 
of members.7 
Article IV refers to general obligations of members 
regarding exchange arrangements. In this regard, members are 
required to “to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to 
 
global reserve currency whose creation is not linked to the external position of 
any particular national economy could provide a better system to manage the 
instability analyzed above.”); Zhou, supra note 5 (“Issuing countries of reserve 
currencies are constantly confronted with the dilemma between achieving their 
domestic monetary policy goals and meeting other countries’ demand for 
reserve currencies. On the one hand, the monetary authorities cannot simply 
focus on domestic goals without carrying out their international 
responsibilities； on the other hand, they cannot pursue different domestic and 
international objectives at the same time.”). 
 7. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. I, Jul. 22, 1944 (entered into 
force Dec. 27, 1945). 
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promote a stable system of exchange rates.”8 
In particular, each member is required to: 
ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic 
and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to 
produce erratic disruptions; and 
iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary 
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members;9 
In Section 3, the same clause addresses surveillance by the 
Fund over exchange arrangements: 
(a) The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order 
to ensure its effective operation, and shall oversee the compliance of 
each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article. 
(b) In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the Fund shall 
exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, 
and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with 
respect to those policies. Each member shall provide the Fund with the 
information necessary for such surveillance, and, when requested by 
the Fund, shall consult with it on the member’s exchange rate policies. 
The principles adopted by the Fund shall be consistent with 
cooperative arrangements by which members maintain the value of 
their currencies in relation to the value of the currency or currencies of 
other members, as well as with other exchange arrangements of a 
member’s choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund and Section 
1 of this Article. These principles shall respect the domestic social and 
political policies of members, and in applying these principles the 
Fund shall pay due regard to the circumstances of members.10 
The Articles of Agreement also refer to the objective of 
making the Special Drawing Right (SDR) “the principal reserve 
asset in the international monetary system.”11 
The Special Drawing Right is a reserve asset issued by the 
IMF that confers to holders “a potential claim on the freely 
usable currencies of IMF members”—that is, they can be 
exchanged for any of the IMF’s reserve currencies.12 
In Article VIII, Section 7: 
Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and with other 
members in order to ensure that the policies of the member with 
respect to reserve assets shall be consistent with the objectives of 
promoting better international surveillance of international liquidity 
 
 8. Id. art. IV(1). 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. sec. 3. 
 11. Id. art. VIII(7). 
 12. IMF, Special Drawing Rights: A Factsheet (Feb. 2009). 
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and making the special drawing right the principal reserve asset in the 
international monetary system.”13 
According to Article XXII, in addition to the obligations 
assumed with respect to special drawing rights under other 
articles, “each participant undertakes to collaborate with the 
Fund and with other participants in order to facilitate . . .the 
proper use of special drawing rights in accordance with this 
Agreement and with the objective of making the special drawing 
right the principal reserve asset in the international monetary 
system.”14 
Also relevant are Articles XV to XXVI that develop the 
Special Drawing Rights. 
In Article XV it is determined that the Fund has the 
authority to allocate Special Drawing Rights “To meet the need, 
as and when it arises, for a supplement to existing reserve 
assets . . . .”15 
The Special Drawing Right allocations can be made to 
members that are participants in the Special Drawing Rights 
department.16 The Fund itself can hold SDRs in the General 
Resources Account and “accept and use them in operations and 
transactions conducted through the General Resources 
Account.”17 It can also prescribe by 85 % majority vote that non-
members, members that are not participants, institutions that 
function as Central Banks for one or more members, as well as 
other official entities can also be prescribed holders of SDRs.18 
These provisions restrict the universe of holders of SDRs. 
In Article XVIII, the conditions under which SDRs can be 
issued are established: 
In all its decisions with respect to the allocation and cancellation of 
special drawing rights the Fund shall seek to meet the long-term 
global need, as and when it arises, to supplement existing reserve 
assets in such manner as will promote the attainment of its purposes 
and will avoid economic stagnation and deflation as well as excess 
demand and inflation in the world.19 
Article XX prescribes the interest and service charges on 
 
 13. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 7, art. VIII(7). 
 14. Id. art. XXII. 
 15. Id. art. XVII(1). 
 16. Id. Nowadays all members of the IMF area also members of the SDR 
Department. 
 17. Id. art. XVII(2). 
 18. Id. art. XVII(3). 
 19. See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 7, art. VIII(7), sec. 1. 
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the SDR. A holder of SDRs simultaneously receives and pays 
interest on them.20 Both rates21 are set at the weighted average 
of the interest rates on the short-term instruments in the 
markets of the currencies included in the SDR valuation 
basket.22 
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS 
Since the onset of the crisis, debate on the reform of the 
international monetary system has gained new vigor. This is 
consistent with the perception that global imbalances played a 
role in the crisis and that the persistence of imbalances has to 
do with issues which need to be addressed in the monetary 
system. Proposals for reform have come from governments, 
quasi- and inter-governmental bodies, academics, civil society, 
and the private sector. 
This section briefly summarizes some of the proposals made 
since 2009. Though an exhaustive survey of all proposals made 
in the period exceeds the scope of this section, it attempts to 
capture representations of the different approaches. 
A.  ZHOU XIAOCHUAN’S PROPOSALS 
In an essay released on March 23, 2009, the Governor of the 
Central Bank of China, Mr. Zhou Xiaochuan, examined what 
kind of international reserve currency is needed.23 He posits 
that in order to safeguard global economic and financial 
stability a successful reserve currency should have “a stable 
value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply.”24 
His proposal is for a super-sovereign reserve currency which 
“not only eliminates the inherent risks of credit-based sovereign 
currency, but also makes it possible to manage global liquidity. 
A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global 
institution could be used to both create and control the global 
 
 20. Id. art. XX(1) and(2). 
 21. Id. sec. 3. This is why the SDR cannot be compared to a claim on the 
Fund. This is also why SDR holders incur, as long as they do not use them and 
hold them as reserves, no net charge. However, should they exchange or 
transfer their SDRs, they continue to pay the charge, even though they no 
longer rerceive the interest, on their net allocation. 
 22. Press Release, IMF, IMF Completes Review of SDR Valuation, Press 
Release No. 05/265 (Dec. 2, 2005). 
 23. Zhou, supra note 5. 
 24. Id. 
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liquidity.”25 However, he also recognizes the difficulties in 
implementing such a proposal and therefore calls for giving a 
greater role to the Special Drawing Right, because it has “the 
features and potential to act as a super-sovereign reserve 
currency.”26 
He also calls for a number of reforms to the SDR itself in 
order to enable the scope of use so it can fully satisfy countries’ 
demand for reserve currency: 
“Set up a settlement system between the SDR and other currencies. 
Therefore, the SDR, which is now only used between governments and 
international institutions, could become a widely accepted means of 
payment in international trade and financial transactions. 
Actively promote the use of the SDR in international trade, 
commodities pricing, investment and corporate book-keeping. This will 
help enhance the role of the SDR, and will effectively reduce the 
fluctuation of prices of assets denominated in national currencies and 
related risks. 
Create financial assets denominated in the SDR to increase its appeal. 
The introduction of SDR-denominated securities, which is being 
studied by the IMF, will be a good start. 
Further improve the valuation and allocation of the SDR. The basket 
of currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation should be expanded 
to include currencies of all major economies, and the GDP may also be 
included as a weight. The allocation of the SDR can be shifted from a 
purely calculation-based system to a system backed by real assets, 
such as a reserve pool, to further boost market confidence in its 
value.”27 
He further states that the Fund could set up an open-ended 
SDR-denominated fund, allowing subscription and redemption 
in the existing reserve currencies by various investors as 
desired. This arrangement “can even lay a foundation for 
increasing SDR allocation to gradually replace existing reserve 
currencies with the SDR.”28 This last part of his proposal closely 
resembles the Substitution account proposal discussed, but 
ultimately rejected, in the late 1970s. 
Because the substitution account appears in several 
proposals, it is pertinent to give a brief explanation of what the 
original proposal entailed. The account would have been an off-
market mechanism that allowed IMF members to exchange 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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foreign currency reserve assets for SDR-denominated claims.29 
The service this mechanism would have done to countries 
attempting to diversify reserves is that they could shift reserve 
holdings from dollar to SDRs without a large amount of US 
dollars entering the market and, thus, triggering a collapse in 
its value. 
Talks concerning the institution of such an account 
dissolved as countries were unable to agree on how to limit the 
risk borne by the IMF as a result of the exchange rate mismatch 
created, e.g., scenarios in which the liabilities in SDRs 
outweighed the value of the accumulated assets denominated in 
US dollars.30 
B. UN COMMISSION PROPOSALS 
In a recent report on the global monetary system, the UN 
Commission addressed the issue of reform.31 In the report, the 
Commission dismisses the option of a multi-currency reserve 
system: “The basic advantage of a multi-polar reserve world is, 
of course, that it provides room for diversification. However, it 
would come at the cost of adding an additional element of 
instability: the exchange rate volatility among currencies used 
as reserve assets. If central banks and private agents were to 
respond to exchange rate fluctuations by changing the 
composition of their international assets, this would feed into 
exchange rate instability.”32 
Instead, the report proposes a “truly global reserve 
currency.”33 Pursuant to the proposal, the IMF, currently the 
only issuer of a global currency, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), 
would receive responsibility for managing the global reserve 
 
 29. IMF, Reserve Accumulation, supra note 6, at 24. 
 30. However, see id. at 25 (arguing that if there is coordination so reserve 
holdings are exchanged in the same proportion as the SDR basket, there is no 
accompanying exchange risk). The IMF states the purpose of the account would 
not be diversification but an increase in the proportion of SDR-denominated 
claims held as reserves. However, while this is true from an aggregate 
perspective, it is not necessarily true in the context of countries exchanging 
their assets, assuming the proper coordination is there. 
 31. U.N. Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its 
Impact on Development, June 24–26, 2009, Report of the Commission of Experts 
of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the 
International Monetary and Financial System [hereinafter Report of the 
Comm’n of Experts]. 
 32. Id. at 97. 
 33. Id. 
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system, or such authority may be given to a new institution 
such as a “Global Reserve Bank.”34 
The Commission suggests two possible approaches. One is 
that countries agree to exchange their own currencies for the 
new currency—the Commission calls them “International 
Currency Certificates (ICCs)” but clarifies that they could be 
SDRs—and vice-versa, just as IMF quotas work today.35 
The other is that the international agency that creates the 
global reserves also issue the currency, allocating the “ICCs” to 
member countries in the same way Special Drawing Rights are 
currently issued. In this case, the “backing” for the global 
currency would be “the commitment of central banks to accept it 
in exchange for their own currencies” and is what would give the 
currency “the character of an international reserve currency, the 
same way that acceptance by citizens of payments in a national 
currency gives it the character of the domestic money.”36 
The Commission also states that “The allocation can and 
should have built into it incentives and/or penalties to 
discourage maintaining large surpluses. Countries that 
maintain excessive surpluses could lose all or part of their quota 
allocations if they are not utilized in a timely manner to 
increase global demand.”37 
Issuances could be fixed—a certain amount every year—or, 
in a more sophisticated version, could be adjusted 
countercyclically.38 
Finally, the Commission points out that the move towards a 
global reserve currency, could also happen in more evolutionary 
ways. For instance, existing regional agreements—either based 
on swap arrangements among central banks or on foreign 
exchange reserve pools—may provide a feasible alternative.39 
C. WORLD CONFERENCE PROPOSALS 
Another important set of discussions on reforms to the 
global reserve system took place at The World Conference on the 
Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impacts on Development, 
held at the United Nations in June 2009. This conference is 
 
 34. Id. at 98. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 99. 
 37. Report of the Comm’n of Experts at 99. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 120–21. 
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important to highlight because it generated the first global 
consensus on post-crisis reforms of the international financial 
system. In its Outcome Document, the Conference addressed the 
issue of global monetary reform in the following terms: 
35. We recognize that increases in global liquidity play a useful role in 
overcoming the financial crisis. Therefore, we strongly support and call 
for early implementation of the new general special drawing right 
(SDR) allocation of $250 billion. We also call for the urgent ratification 
of the fourth amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement of for a 
special one-time allocation of SDRs, as approved by the IMF Board of 
Governors in September 1997. We recognize the need for keeping 
under review the allocation of SDRs for development purposes. We also 
recognize the potential of expanded SDRs to help increase global 
liquidity in response to the urgent financial shortfalls caused by this 
crisis and to help prevent future crises. This potential should be 
further studied. 
36. The crisis has intensified calls by some States for reform of the 
current global reserve system to overcome its insufficiencies. We 
acknowledge the calls by many States for further study of the 
feasibility and advisability of a more efficient reserve system, 
including the possible function of SDRs in any such system and the 
complementary roles that could be played by various regional 
arrangements. We also acknowledge the importance of seeking 
consensus on the parameters of such a study and its implementation. 
We recognize the existence of new and existing regional and 
subregional economic and financial cooperation initiatives to address, 
inter alia, the liquidity shortfalls and the short-term balance of 
payment difficulties among its members.40 
 D. IMF PROPOSALS 
The International Monetary Fund has also recently 
addressed the issue of reform in the context of a process for 
reviewing its mandate that the Fund’s policymaking body of the 
Board of Governors requested.41 A section of a paper discussed 
at the Executive Board of the institution and that addresses 
diversification of reserve currencies puts forward several 
 
 40. Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact 
on Development, June 24–26, 2009, Outcome Document of the Conference, ¶¶ 
35–36, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.214/3 (June 22, 2009). 
 41. See Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (Oct. 
4, 2009) (“. . . the crisis has shown that a further reassessment of the Fund’s 
mandate is in order. We call on the Fund to review its mandate to cover the full 
range of macroeconomic and financial sector policies that bear on global 
stability, and to report back to the Committee by the time of the next Annual 
Meetings.”), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np /sec/pr/2009/pr09347.h
tm. 
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potential reforms. 
One of the options the paper develops is that of a multi-
polar currency system.42 While recognizing that the process of 
getting there might be quite long, the IMF states that the 
emergence of new reserve currencies may add momentum to a 
more multi-polar reserve system.43 Whether such a system is an 
improvement, the Fund admits, may be open to question. It 
highlights that volatility among reserve currencies, both short 
and long term, is likely to be high, posing costs for trade and 
investment. At the same time, the hedging opportunities may 
increase, and the Fund considers that Central Bank 
management of their reserve portfolios in a coordinated and 
transparent way may contribute a great deal to limit such 
volatility.44  
The paper states such a scenario may call for the Fund to 
play a role in encouraging reserve holders to manage currency 
composition of reserves only gradually, and require information 
from them on the composition of their reserves, among other 
things.45 The paper also develops the option—either as a 
complement or the logical end point of a multi-polar system—of 
supranational reserve currencies: both a greater role for the 
SDR and a globally-issued currency, distinct from the SDR.46 
Taking the path of increasing the role of the SDR would 
require several steps. First, it requires increasing the stock of 
SDRs significantly, which calls for allocations of substantial new 
amounts.47 Second, it would require the official sector to issue 
SDR-denominated instruments that could be traded “within the 
official sector or in some cases issued to the private sector.”48 In 
this vein, the IMF mentions the “substitution account” idea: 
“Operated by the IMF, the account would be an off-market 
mechanism for IMF members to exchange foreign currency 
reserve assets for SDR-denominated claims.”49 It recognizes, 
nonetheless, the challenges to achieving an acceptable burden-
sharing mechanism to cover the foreign exchange risk.50 It also 
 
 42. Baqir, supra note 2, at 18. 
 43. Id. at 18. 
 44. Id. at 18. 
 45. Id. at 19–20. 
 46. Id. at 20. 
 47. Id. at 23. 
 48. Baqir, supra note 2, at 24. 
 49. Id. at 25. 
 50. Id. at 24. 
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mentions the possibility of issuing more IMF purchasing notes 
denominated in SDRs, or having other international financial 
institutions issue SDR-denominated bonds,51 and government 
issuing of debt denominated in SDRs.52 The third step would be 
the promotion of invoicing of international trade and finance in 
SDRs, in addition to developing clearance systems in SDR-
denominated instruments, which could further enhance its role 
as a reserve asset. 53 Fourth, the basket composition of the SDR 
might require revision to render it transparent, simple, and 
automatic, so that changes are predictable.54 
On the other hand, taking the path of a sui generis global 
currency, distinct from the SDR, has as its main advantage, 
creation of actual currency. The SDR is not a currency, which 
makes conversion into a currency for any payments or foreign 
exchange interventions necessary.55 This currency could be 
adopted by fiat as a common currency or, in a less ambitious 
version, circulate alongside national currencies.56 Even in this 
latter case, the IMF says, “it would need to be adopted by fiat by 
at least some (not necessarily systemic) countries in order for an 
exchange market to develop.”57 
The IMF recognizes the presence of major obstacles to 
implementing this idea: “Absent significant monetary instability 
or an injunction for use of bancor for the making of an important 
set of payments (e.g. payment of taxes), surmounting the 
barriers to wide acceptance would be a key and perhaps 
prohibitive challenge.”58 
It is worth noting that after considering all these proposals 
the Board of Directors of the Fund submitted a report to the 
Annual Meetings. In this report, the Board pledges to take 
further work on pragmatic steps that the Fund and its members 
can take to strengthen the stability of the international 
monetary system.59 The same document says, “The scope for a 
greater role for the SDR (both in the official and private sector) 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Baqir, supra note 2, at 26. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 27. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Progress Report to the 
IMFC on the Fund’s Mandate, at 7 (Oct. 6, 2006). 
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to strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of the IMS will be 
considered further, with due regard for the realism, implications 
and potential costs of fostering demand for an alternative 
reserve asset.”60 
 E. UNCTAD TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT PROPOSALS 
Another set of reform proposals comes from UNCTAD’s 
2009 Trade and Development Report. In general, its proposals 
follow those that had been made by the UN Commission, but 
they include an additional focus on a multilateral framework for 
real exchange rates management.61 This becomes necessary, 
UNCTAD says, because the exchange rate is a variable that 
involves more than one currency.62 The agency argues that “[a]n 
internationally agreed exchange-rate system based on the 
principle of constant and sustainable real exchange rates (RER) 
of all countries would go a long way towards reducing the scope 
for speculative capital flows, which generate volatility in the 
international financial system and distort the pattern of 
exchange rates.”63 In UNCTAD’s view, this system would also, 
among other things, prevent fundamental and long-lasting 
global imbalances and reduce the need to hold international 
reserves because these would no longer be necessary to defend 
an exchange rate level.64 The proposed constant RER would 
result from nominal exchange rates strictly following inflation 
differentials.65 
The Government of France has become increasingly vocal in 
its promotion of reforms of the global monetary system, and 
President Nicolas Sarkozy has more or less explicitly referred to 
a “new Bretton Woods.”66 As France prepares to exercise the 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. U.N. CTAD, Trade and Development Report Responding to the Global 
Crisis: Climate Change Mitigation and Development, 127 UNCTAD/TDR/2009 
(2009); see also U.N. CTAD, Global and Regional Approaches to Trade and 
Finance, 50, NCTAD/GDS/2007/1 (Dec. 2007) (more specifically referring to a 
“multilateral approach in the form of a code of conduct.”). 
 62. UNCTAD Report 2009, supra note 61, at 127. See also UNCTAD 
Report 2007, supra note 61 (“The exchange rate of any country is, by definition, 
a multilateral phenomenon . . .”). 
 63. UNCTAD Report 2009, supra note 61, at 128. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Interview with President Nicolas Sarkozy (2010). Stating “I have three 
major objectives: first, a new international monetary order. Bretton Woods is 65 
years old. There was only a single currency, the dollar. We cannot continue 
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Presidency of the Group of 20 and the Group of 8 in 2011, the 
adoption of this priority is a significant development. In a recent 
speech delivered in Washington, DC, French Minister of 
Finance, Ms. Christine Lagarde, further developed what the 
French vision might entail: 
[W]e want to tackle three essential proposals. 
One is we want to try to explore ways to protect particularly those 
least developed countries, and sometimes emerging countries, from 
which there have been capital flows – as I said – in and out, depending 
on expectations and currency variations. So protecting will be one 
avenue to explore. 
The second one will be diversify, because as it stands today, there is 
clearly a lack of diversification, which induces, in and of itself, a level 
of risk that is associated with the currency variation. 
And third, there is really a need to actually coordinate and coordinate 
better – because decisions that are made unilaterally are not going to 
be as efficient as if they were made as it happened in the past – on a 
much more concerted basis.67 
 F. MCKINSEY PROPOSALS 
Finally, in 2009, the McKinsey Global Institute released a 
discussion paper that is clearly focused on diagnosing and 
making predictions on the issues of the monetary system, 
particularly highlighting the problems that the imbalances and 
volatility carry for business executives. However, in the final 
chapter it hints at some proposals. Assessing the IMF proposals 
for reforms based on the Special Drawing Rights, the study 
acknowledges that SDRs have “clear drawbacks” and mentions 
in particular that they constitute a very small portion of total 
reserves.68 However, it goes on to state that these issues can be 
addressed, in part through the private sector issuing its own 
synthetic SDR instruments.69 It concludes that “[t]here is no 
fundamental reason why SDRs cannot become a more 
significant part of the global exchange rate system in the 
 
with the monetary disorders we face now.” See also Gillian Tett, Do not dismiss 
Sarkozy’s back to the future currency plan, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010 
(quoting Sarkozy’s statement “The prosperity of the postwar era owned much to 
Bretton Woods . . . We need a new Bretton Woods."). 
 67. Lagarde, Christine, Minister for Economy, Industry and Employment 
of France, Address at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Oct. 7, 
2010) (transcript by Federal News Service). 
 68. McKinsey Global Institute, supra note 5, at 38. 
 69. Id. at 38. 
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future.”70 Likewise, the paper pinpoints the renewed attention 
paid to proposals to achieve a greater degree of policy 
coordination in the exchange rate system, saying this may 
resemble the “negotiated exchange rate arrangements in the 
1980s.”71 
An important insight of the study is its finding that, given 
the limited benefits that the status of reserve currency issuers 
carries nowadays for the United States or the European Union, 
there will be support for some important changes in the 
exchange rate system in the coming years.72 Therefore, the 
uncertainty in the reserve system is greater than “today’s dollar 
dominance and the lack of a near-term challenger might 
suggest.” 73 
V. CURRENT CHALLENGES A REFORM OF THE 
MONETARY SYSTEM MUST ADDRESS 
Current proposals to reform the monetary system should be 
assessed against the backdrop of four acute and current 
challenges that may require action. The first, perhaps most 
obvious challenge, is how to foster an orderly exit from the 
global imbalances. As mentioned earlier, the inability of the 
system to carry out automatic adjustments of imbalances is, in 
the eyes of several analysts, at the heart of the recent crisis. 
There is a fear that, without fixing that problem, future crises 
are just a matter of time. 
The second challenge is reducing currency volatility and its 
consequent negative implications for trade flows. Achieving this 
reduction is of great importance to trade flows. It is no 
coincidence that facilitating “the expansion and balanced growth 
of international trade” is chief among the Fund’s enumerated 
purposes.74 In fact, the positive influence of a stable monetary 
system on the evolution of world trade was clear to the 
intellectual founders of the system. John Maynard Keynes has 
been famously quoted for saying that “[i]t is extraordinarily 
difficult to frame any proposals about tariffs if countries are free 
to alter the value of their currencies without agreement at short 
 
 70. Id. at 38–39. 
 71. Id. at 39. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. I(ii). 
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notice. Tariffs and currency depreciations are in many cases 
alternatives. Without currency agreements you have no firm 
ground on which to discuss tariffs.”75 Recently asked whether a 
stable exchange rate is more favorable to trade, renowned 
economist Robert Mundell replied that “[t]he whole idea of 
having a free trade area when you have gyrating exchange rates 
doesn’t make sense at all. It just spoils the effect of any kind of 
free trade agreement.”76 
Increased levels of exchange rate volatility have a strong 
impact on trade performance through channels such as the 
levels of domestic investment, the variations of relative prices of 
export products (which, in turn, affect competitiveness of the 
economies), and the price of access to finance for production. 
Such variations significantly affect the value of market access 
concessions and price-based trade liberalization measures that 
receive so much attention in trade negotiations. 
There is obviously a connection between addressing the first 
challenge and this one. The large imbalances in a world of free 
capital flows have contributed to the increased volatility of 
currency prices. It is expected that fluctuations among reserve 
currencies would also be eased if the imbalances were smaller. 
However, on what basis imbalances are reduced is also an 
important variable in determining how stable the system can 
be. For instance, it is to be expected that trying to adjust 
imbalances—which is possible—in a US dollar-based system, 
would have different implications than those in a multi-polar 
system and, yet, different from those in a system centered 
around a strengthened role for the SDR. 
The third challenge monetary reform should address is 
preventing adjustment mechanisms from having negative 
impacts on full employment. This could be done by ensuring the 
preservation of adequate levels of aggregate demand and 
symmetric adjustment mechanisms for both deficit and surplus 
nations. The current system not only fails in closing the 
imbalances but also in regards to the available mechanism for 
adjustment, which is, by definition, recessionary. 
As put by Jose Antonio Ocampo, the present system’s 
 
 75. Communication from U.N. Conference on Trade and Development to 
Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, Economic Policy Challenges in an 
Open Economy: Coherence between Trade and Finance ¶ 1, WT/WGTDF/W/27 
(Nov. 7, 2004). 
 76. Judy Shelton, Currency Chaos: Where Do We Go From Here?, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 16, 2010. 
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recessionary bias “is particularly noticeable during crises, when 
the threat of capital flight and/or the lack of adequate financing 
forces deficit nations to adjust, a dilemma not faced by surplus 
nations.”77 
The recessionary or deflationary bias stems directly from 
the asymmetry in adjustment pressure faced by surplus versus 
that faced by deficit nations.78 Thus, while deficit nations have 
to adjust by reducing their level of imports and consumption, 
surplus nations have no symmetric obligation to raise theirs.79 
This asymmetry conspires against adequate aggregate demand 
and employment levels, and taken together, results in the global 
economy consistently working below full employment levels. 
The final challenge, to which monetary reform is a 
backdrop, is the need for generating innovative sources of 
development and climate finance. Estimates in the lead up to 
the recent Millennium Summit put the need of resources to 
fulfill the international development goals and climate change 
in the range of USD 324-336 billion per year between 2012 and 
2017.80 The recent Copenhagen Accord pledged USD 30 billion a 
year of additional financing in the period 2010-2012 for 
adaptation and mitigation, and to reach the figure of USD 100 
billion a year by 2020.81 In a time where donors are struggling 
to, in some cases, merely maintain aid levels either in absolute 
terms or as a share of GDP, because of budget gaps generated 
by the crisis, it is unclear where the financing to meet these 
commitments will come from. 
It would seem at first sight that the reform of the monetary 
system has nothing to do with how to obtain financing for 
development or climate purposes. But, questions about the link 
 
 77. Ocampo, supra note 5, at 2. 
 78. Carney, supra note 3, at 2 “[I]t is generally much less costly, 
economically as well as politically, f.or countries with a balance of payments 
surplus to run persistent surpluses and accumulate reserves than it is for 
deficit countries to sustain deficits.” Id. 
 79. UNCTAD Report 2009, supra note 61, at 122. See also IMF, Reserve 
Accumulation, supra note 6, at 9 (“If the counterpart of reserve accumulation is 
that many countries pursue current account surpluses, an aggregate 
deflationary impact may emerge to the extent that the rest of the world is no 
longer willing to incur balance of payments deficits.”). 
 80. Globalizing Solidarity: The Case for Financial Levies 2, (Task Force on 
International Financial Transactions and Development, Report of the 
Committee of Experts, Oct. 22, 2010). 
 81. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteen session, held in 
Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009 7, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 
2010). The document is generally known as the Copenhagen Accord. 
CALIARI - Final Version 5/6/2011 12:06 PM 
2011] UPDATING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 607 
between SDRs in development—and, by extension, climate—
finance gain relevancy since some of the reform proposals 
involve reform of the SDRs or, alternatively, a global reserve 
currency. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF REFORMS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In light of the preceding analysis, this section asks whether 
and to what extent the reforms to the international monetary 
system needed to respond to such challenges can be undertaken 
within the existing legal framework. In this process, it also 
intends to outline the areas where legal reform may be required. 
A. THE CHALLENGE OF REDUCING GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
Some proposals for reducing global imbalances, definitely 
those that are most actively being debated by decision-makers 
at present, attempt to fix the imbalances within the framework 
of the dollar-based system. In these scenarios, the solution 
would have to do with strengthening coordination mechanisms 
so that surplus and deficit countries take measures to reduce 
the imbalances. In fact, there is a track record of more than ten 
years of failed IMF attempts to exercise this function. Since the 
late 1990s, countries have attempted to place the locus of this 
coordination at the International Monetary Fund, first with the 
utilization of Article IV consultations and, since 2006, with the 
initiation of the “Multilateral Consultations on Surveillance.”82 
As an informal forum that brings together leaders of 
systemically important countries, the Group of 20 has tried to 
give a political response to this challenge and become a forum 
for coordination. But its own record - admittedly a short one - is 
not much better. At their Summit held in Pittsburgh in 
September 2009, the G20 agreed on a “Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable, and Balanced Growth.”83 The declared intention of 
this framework was to lead to a correction and to prevent the 
future recreation of imbalances between countries with high 
 
 82. Contra IMF, The Fund’s Mandate – The Legal Framework 9, Prepared 
by the Legal Department In Consultation with the Strategy, Policy and Review 
Department Approved by Sean Hagan (Feb. 22, 2010). According to the Fund, 
the prerogative for exercising this function has a different source in Art. IV, in 
the prescription that the Fund “Shall oversee the international monetary 
system in order to ensure its effective operation.” 
 83. Group of 20, Leader’s Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit ¶ 15 (Sep. 
24–25, 2009). 
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current account surpluses and those with high current account 
deficits. The exercise has yielded so far limited progress. Earlier 
this year, the Managing Director of the International Monetary 
Fund, in relation to the reports on growth prospects that the 
institution was gathering from countries, said that it was clear 
that the forecasts “will not add up” and that “[e]xports from one 
region to another region have to equal imports and it won’t be 
the case.”84 
In the lead up to the G20 Finance Ministers meeting held in 
Gyeongju, Korea on October 23, 2010, currency tensions became 
so intense that the Finance Minister of Brazil, Mr. Guido 
Mantega, spoke of a “currency war.” Indeed, Japan’s foreign 
exchange intervened for the first time since 2004 to weaken the 
value of the yen and the prospect of the US expanding its 
quantitative easing program in order to boost ailing growth, 
evoked, for many, ghosts from the inter-war period’s race of 
competitive devaluations. US Secretary of Treasury, Mr. 
Geithner, made a proposal to cap current account surpluses as a 
share of GDP. However, Mr. Geithner’s proposal that 
implementation is to be policed by the IMF is, given the 
aforementioned appraisal of the Fund’s performance, akin to a 
return to square one. 
As analysts quoted earlier in this discussion paper 
observe,85 the fact that these mechanisms attempt to operate 
within a system where the currency of one country is the 
dominant reserve and trading asset conspires against their 
success. However, should one choose to follow this path, there 
are reasons to hold the existing legal framework for the 
international monetary system as inadequate. One can agree 
that the IMF Articles of Agreement put members under specific 
obligations with regards to the conduct of exchange rate policy 
and also domestic policies that affect the exchange rate.86 
Similarly, the Fund has an obligation to exert “firm 
surveillance” over exchange rate policies - as opposed to the 
general responsibility given by the Articles of Agreement - on all 
of members’ obligations that emanated from Article IV.87 
But the Fund lacks any teeth to ensure that “firm 
 
 84. Chris Giles, IMF chief warns of reliance on exports, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Jan. 30 2010. 
 85. See generally Section III of this paper. 
 86. See IMF, The Fund’s Mandate, supra note 82, at 4. This is the Fund’s 
own interpretation. 
 87. Id. at 6. 
CALIARI - Final Version 5/6/2011 12:06 PM 
2011] UPDATING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 609 
surveillance” translates into policy change in the members. 
Given the power held at the Board by the members where such 
decisions would matter, it is unlikely that members will reach 
consensus regarding legal changes necessary to grant the IMF 
more enforcement power. If changes were adopted, it is unlikely 
such revisions would actually affect practice in a significant 
way.88 
A number of proposals for reform suggest moving to a 
multi-currency system.89 One important advantage of this 
system is that more than one country acts as reserve issuer, 
which introduces some diversity in the macroeconomic factors 
likely to influence the supply of reserve currencies. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that a multi-currency-based 
proposal would adequately respond to the challenge of global 
imbalances. For one, it is unclear in multi-currency system 
proposals how such multiplicity is maintained over time, 
without a move to a particular currency becoming paramount. 
Moreover, a system where several domestic currencies can 
operate as reserves is what we have today. But the system has, 
nonetheless, inexorably moved to US dollar’s pre-eminence, with 
quite visible and unsatisfactory results. The proponents have 
not been able to explain how to avoid this result in the future. 
These proposals have been dismissed by others on the 
grounds that they would generate greater instability.90 Those 
who believe the instability in this scenario could be dealt with, 
do so on the assumption, again, of strong measures for 
coordination among currency issuers and central banks.91 A 
 
 88. One obstacle has to do with the inevitable fact that the Fund wields 
more power with member countries that somehow depend on it for balance of 
payments support. Neither the countries that have large surpluses, nor those 
that issue reserve currencies, belong into such category, leaving the Fund to 
wield any potential power upon countries that are generally irrelevant to the 
problem at hand. 
 89. See CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, BEYOND THE DOLLAR: RETHINKING THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM , at ix (Paola Subacchi & John Driffill eds., 
2010) (recommending that to “Develop a multicurrency reserve system that is 
appropriate for a world of regional trading blocs – Europe, Asia, the Americas – 
alongside a still preeminent dollar. The disadvantage of losing network 
externalities would be compensated by gaining stability. Historical experience 
has shown that two or more reserve currencies can operate simultaneously.”); 
IMF, Reserve Accumulation, supra note 6, at 18. 
 90. See Report of the Comm’n of Experts, supra note 31, at 113; Ocampo, 
supra note 5, at 3–4 (Briefing Paper #1, FES New York, January 2010) 
(acknowledging it—even if more optimistic about possibilities to manage it); 
IMF, Reserve Accumulation, supra note 6, at 18. 
 91. See IMF, Reserve Accumulation, supra note 6, at 18–19 (“[t]hat a multi-
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multi-currency system can work, therefore, in scenarios that are 
highly optimistic on the feasibility for such cooperation, 
optimism that experience hardly warrants. 
Several of the proposals suggest that in order to solve the 
problem of global imbalances there is a need to establish a 
supranational reserve currency or anchor the system in the 
SDRs. However, it does not follow that merely shifting from the 
US-dollar to a supranational currency (or reserve asset, as in 
the case of the SDR) as the main reserve currency would deal 
with existing global imbalances. Such a change would certainly 
be a helpful—and for some analysts even necessary—condition. 
And it would certainly reduce the need for reserve currency 
issuers to have to run deficits and free the reserve asset from 
the vagaries of a single country’s economy. 
However, it does not solve the underlying problem of 
surplus countries accumulating excessive amounts of currency 
or resolving the problems inherent to the erosion of value of the 
asset in question.92 As noted by the Governor of the Central 
Bank of Canada, there is no guarantee that the more prominent 
use of the SDR—or the substitution account—would not simply 
entrench and encourage existing strategies of surplus 
countries,93 rather than contribute to greater balance. It seems, 
therefore, that even under this scenario, the system would not 
succeed in the absence of an effective mechanism for the orderly 
adjustment between deficit and surplus countries. 
The UN Commission has offered a solution, in the form of a 
new body, within the aegis of the United Nations. This body, a 
Global Economic Coordination Council, would be the “seat of the 
political commitment to symmetric adjustments of international 
 
currency system might exhibit greater, if not continued high, long-run 
volatility. . . . is not a foregone conclusion: to the extent that central banks 
manage their international reserves portfolio to maintain constant shares of 
the different reserve currencies, they could play a stabilizing role such that 
volatility would be lower in the end in the steady state. . . . In any event, the 
volatility issue will likely remain in any IMS—new or current—in the absence 
of greater policy coordination between reserve issuers . . . .”). 
 92. See Jan Kregel, Some Simple Observations on the Reform of the 
International Monetary System, 3–5 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Policy Note, 
2009/8). 
 93. See Carney, supra note 3, at 6 (“Indeed, by providing instant 
diversification, SDR reserves could entrench some of the existing strategies of 
surplus countries.”); id. (“A substitution account would create considerable 
moral hazard, since reserve holders would be tempted to engage in further 
accumulation.”); id. at 7, (pointing to a problem of moral hazard with the 
substitution account). 
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imbalances.”94 While the new body would avoid some of the 
governance imbalances of the IMF, and would arguably be born 
with some fresh political capital, the UN Commission’s proposal 
is unclear about how the new body will have the teeth to enforce 
its decisions that the IMF lacks. 
One way out of the conundrum—and one that we owe to 
Keynes—would be to design the reserve asset in a way that 
provides an incentive to generate automatic or semi-automatic 
adjustment between surplus and deficit countries. Keynes 
proposed a reserve asset termed “bancor,” which, if held in 
excessive quantities, would be reduced. As such, it was useless 
to try to engage in excessive accumulation of it. The UN 
Commission seems to have had this proposal in mind when, 
speaking of the proposed global currency, it said that it’s new 
allocation “can and should have built into it incentives and/or 
penalties to discourage maintaining large surpluses. Countries 
that maintain excessive surpluses could lose all or part of their 
quota allocations if they are not utilized in a timely manner to 
increase global demand.”95 
A subset of the proposals presented earlier focus on the 
establishment of a supranational currency a-la-bancor. The 
following section deliberately chooses to focus on the conditions 
and potential legal changes to enable the SDR—rather than an 
altogether new, supranational currency— to play such role. 
The reason for this choice is not that, as some of the 
proponents of the latter, say, implementing the idea faces 
daunting challenges—though this is doubtlessly an important 
consideration. It is rather because establishing a new currency 
likely calls for its own new set of rules, including possibly a 
“Global Central Bank.” It is rather obvious that these reforms 
are unattainable in the current legal framework for the 
monetary system and demand a complete re-writing of it. 
On the contrary, increasing the prominence of the SDR is a 
more interesting line of inquiry as it calls for tweaking and 
changing a legal framework that already exists. Additionally, 
even for the hypothetical purpose of totally tearing apart the old 
rules and writing new ones, it is imaginable that exploring 
where an SDR-based system is or is not a good model is a 
profitable enterprise. 
Some might say that reform of the SDR in such a way that 
 
 94. Kregel, supra note 92, at 5. 
 95. See Report of the Comm’n of Experts, supra note 31, at 117. 
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places it at the center of the system is no more than a logical 
extension of the provisions in the IMF Articles of Agreement 
alluding to the obligation of members to make the SDR “the 
principal reserve asset in the international monetary system.”96 
However, as the remainder of this section shows, the 
achievement of this goal is far from feasible were it to remain 
solely within the limits of the Articles of Agreement. The 
required changes to the SDR necessary to enable it to 
adequately perform this function are not possible within the 
current legal framework. 
First, large increases in the available stock of SDRs would 
be needed to turn the SDR into a preferred asset. A historically 
large allocation of SDR in the amount of USD 250 billion was 
made in 2009.97 Nonetheless, SDRs merely made up a total of 
only 4% of the total stock of reserves.98 Increasing the stock of 
SDRs to the extent necessary to make them a significant portion 
of total reserves in the world may be difficult in the context of 
the current strict legal requirements pertaining to new 
issuances of SDRs. Thus, a relaxation of the requirements to 
issue SDRs is one of the legal reforms that needs to happen. 
Second, the SDR would need to become, in itself, a means of 
payment, not just a reserve asset. In the current form, SDRs are 
not a useful devise for sustaining balance. Should countries 
choose not to use the SDRs as a reserve asset, but rather to 
purchase imports, they will have to swap them for a hard 
currency—most likely US dollars. To the extent that this is the 
case, the demand for USD will either remain unchanged, or 
grow, but will certainly not decrease. The fact that the SDR 
needs to be swapped by a hard currency in order to serve as a 
means of payment also may at some point begin to entail some 
liquidity risks, which would also harm its capacity to act as a 
reserve asset. Liquidity risk is the prospect that there may not 
be enough of the desired currency (usually US dollars) available 
to exchange SDRs. This risk is not great with the amount of 
SDRs in circulation today, but it cannot be ruled out in a not too 
distant future. It is indicative that the IMF already found it 
 
 96. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. VIII(7). 
 97. Adding this to an allocation in the amount of USD 33 billion that had 
been pending US ratification since the 1990s, and was approved also at the 
same time, brings the total amount up to USD 283 billion. Previous allocations 
had taken place in 1970–72 and 1979–81, for a total of USD 33 billion 
altogether. See UN Commission 2009, supra note 95, at 119. 
 98. See IMF, Reserve Accumulation, supra note 6, at 22. 
CALIARI - Final Version 5/6/2011 12:06 PM 
2011] UPDATING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 613 
necessary to address this liquidity issue in looking at the 
technical aspects of its most recent allocation.99 
Third, in order to increase the appeal of the SDR, some of 
its features require modification in ways that cannot take place 
within the current legal framework, as mentioned in some of the 
examined proposals.100 One part of such reform might be to 
amplify the universe of holders, currently restricted by the 
Articles of Agreement to the Fund, members, and a limited 
number of official entities. 
Another solution may be to encourage greater use of the 
SDR in invoicing international transactions. Otherwise, since 
there will always be a certain exchange rate risk between the 
value of the actual currency that a country uses in international 
transactions and the SDR, countries have an incentive to keep 
their reserves in the actual currency that needs to be used for 
the settlement. 
Currently, because of the limited transferability of SDRs, 
they cannot be used in foreign exchange transactions. This 
diminishes the SDR’s effectiveness as a reserve asset. A reserve 
asset that cannot be directly used by a government to intervene 
in its forex markets and influence the value of its currency 
would be of limited use. 
A third area that may need addressing is the fact that some 
public sector actions that would be useful to prop up the role of 
the SDR in the system are limited by the current legal 
framework. For instance, the issuance of SDR-denominated 
instruments which the Fund has done in relatively limited 
fashion, could not reach a higher scale—at least as done by the 
Fund—without bumping against the requirement that 
borrowing is supposed to only complement quota resources. 
Likewise, some suggest that the IMF could foster SDR-
denominated settlement systems, something that, due to its 
current structure, is a far-fetched request.101 
 
 99. See Int’l Monetary Fund, Proposal for a General Allocation of SDRs § 
IV (C), (E) (June 9, 2009) (focusing on the "absorption capacity" of existing 
voluntary arrangements and the possible need to resort to "designation," that 
is, the mechanism by which members with a sufficiently strong external 
position are required to purchase a determined amount of SDRs). 
 100. See, e.g., Zhou, supra note 5 (explaining necessary modifications to 
SDR features to increase appeal). 
 101. See DeAnne Julius, A Roadmap for SDR Evolution, in BEYOND THE 
DOLLAR: RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 39–40 (Paola 
Subacchi & John Driffill eds., 2010) (arguing for IMF fostered settlement 
systems and even for the IMF to act as a market-maker for operations in SDR-
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B. THE CHALLENGE OF EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY 
As explained above, the success in achieving adjustments of 
global imbalances would already introduce a greater level of 
stability in the system. 
Assuming this is done through a combination of SDR 
enhancements and some additional coordination, there still 
remains the question of the ability of the SDR to anchor 
stability. Placing the SDR at the center of the system could 
contribute to lower volatility—by the mere fact that its basket 
comprises several currencies.102 However, since the currencies 
that compose the basket today have exhibited quite a high 
degree of volatility, not the least of which is the US dollar which 
represents 44 % of the weight, it is worth asking the questions 
of whether improvement to the composition of the basket is 
possible in order to reduce volatility further, and what the legal 
implications would be. 
One possible option, perhaps the most simple, would be to 
expand the number of currencies, preserving the same criteria 
for choosing them, from four to eight, or ten. Another option 
would be to change the basket to the currencies of the major 
economies.103 In addition, to understand the context of the 
reforms being analyzed here it is important to acknowledge 
that, while the SDR functions as both a unit of account and a 
reserve asset, there are trade-offs between improving a currency 
basket as a unit of account and as a reserve asset.104 From the 
standpoint of the former, what matters is the correlation 
structure of exchange rate changes of the component currencies. 
From the standpoint of the latter, what matters is high liquidity 
of the component currencies. 105 One of the principles adopted in 
the current valuation method is that the currencies have to be 
freely usable currencies, as defined in Art. XXX.106 This means 
 
denominated bonds). 
 102. According to current rules, the valuation of the SDR is reviewed every 
five years. Since 2006, the four currencies that make up the SDR basket (with 
their weights in it) are: “U.S. dollar (44 percent), euro (34 percent), Japanese 
yen (11 percent), and pound sterling (11 percent).” Press Release No. 05/265, 
Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Completes Review of SDR Valuation (Dec. 2, 2005). 
 103. See Zhou, supra note 5. 
 104. See Holger C. Wolf, Currency Baskets as International Units of 
Account, in THE FUTURE OF THE SDR IN THE LIGHT OF CHANGES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 312 (Michael Mussa et al. eds., 1996). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See IMF Articles art. XXX(f) (defining “freely usable currencies” as a 
“member’s currency that the Fund determines (i) is, in fact, widely used to 
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that the current system has made a choice that, in such trade-
offs, leans towards an asset that has better characteristics as 
reserve than as unit of account. In fact, that freely usable 
currencies are part of the basket brings almost by definition an 
extra dimension of volatility as it is these currencies that are 
most subject to the forces of speculation in international 
financial markets. 
Therefore, in order to improve the stability of the currency 
basket, one could conceive a range of solutions that go from the 
exact opposite—say, one where all SDR components are non-
freely usable currencies—to some acceptable mix between 
convertible and non-convertible currencies. 
There is no substantive principle as to the valuation of the 
SDR embedded in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, so any 
change in the valuation method of the SDR is possible within 
the current legal framework, as long as it is approved by an 85% 
majority vote.107 
C. THE CHALLENGE OF AGGREGATE DEMAND AND FULL 
EMPLOYMENT 
Centering the international monetary system around a 
reserve asset that can stimulate the correction of imbalances 
will make a great contribution to ensuring higher levels of 
aggregate demand than is presently the case. As such, the 
respective reflections on legal reform are also relevant to this 
purpose. Nevertheless, it is worth asking: can the system 
perform better in terms of reaching aggregate demand and full 
employment levels? 
First, it may be desirable to explore establishing a 
connection between the principles determining the issuance of 
new SDRs—and symmetrically, the principles for cancellation—
and linking them to global aggregate demand needs.108 
Second, the issue of the criteria for allocation to members 
may also need to be revisited. Under the current legal 
framework, SDRs are automatically allocated to members on the 
basis of their quota in the IMF. The quota system suffers severe 
 
make payments for international transactions, and (ii) is widely traded in the 
principal exchange markets.”). 
 107. See IMF Articles art. XV(2). 
 108. See, e.g., Ocampo, supra note 5 (“SDR allocations could follow two 
different approaches. The best would be issuing them in a countercyclical way, 
which would mean that they would be issued during crises rather than 
booms.”). 
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limitations, a consensus has been growing in the last decade on 
its inadequacy and obsolescence even as a mechanism for the 
determination of voting weights. 
The focus here is, nonetheless, on examining its consistency 
with attempts to ensure that SDR allocations boost aggregate 
demand. From this perspective, it is relevant to note that the 
logical outcome of using the quota as the principle to allocate 
SDRs is that countries with the largest IMF quotas —some of 
them in no need to increase reserve holdings—receive the 
largest amounts of SDRs. 
A mechanism geared to bolster aggregate demand would 
need, conceivably, to place much more emphasis on what the 
needs of receiving countries are in the light of the shocks or 
spending challenges they face, as opposed to any mechanistic 
assessment. In any case, it is clear that the current mechanism 
is inadequate and suboptimal and could be improved. Such 
changes would require reforms of the principle for allocation as 
currently established in the Articles of Agreement. 
D. THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE 
FINANCE 
The use of SDRs to support development and climate 
finance needs, as mentioned in some of the proposals, might also 
require legal reforms. In principle, the fact that SDRs are 
supposed to be issued for liquidity considerations should not 
pose an obstacle to developing countries that allocate SDRs to 
use for any specific development or climate spending. It should 
also be possible for the IMF to prescribe other international 
institutions as SDR holders, as allowed in Art. XVII, Section 3. 
Thus, it is perfectly possible that multilateral or regional 
development banks back their lending with SDRs.109 
However, difficulties might arise as a result of the Articles 
of Agreement requisite that new allocations “shall seek to meet 
the long-term global need, as and when it arises, to supplement 
existing reserve assets, in such a manner as will promote the 
attainment of its purposes and will avoid economic stagnation 
and deflation as well as excess demand and inflation in the 
 
 109. See Report of the Comm’n of Experts, supra note 31, at 118. (“A simple 
way to further the use of SDR allocations to advance developmental objectives 
(which might require changing the Articles of Agreement) would be for the 
International Monetary and Finance Committee and the IMF Board to allow 
the IMF to invest some of the funds made available through issuance of SDRs 
in bonds issued by multilateral development banks.”). 
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world.”110 
Were one to make a favorable interpretation, the definitions 
of expressions such as “long-term,” “global need,” and 
“supplement existing reserve assets” are not exempt of 
ambiguities that could be used to justify allocations of SDRs to 
be directed to finance development or climate.111 Certainly the 
same could be said of “the attainment of [the Fund]’s purposes” 
that such clause refers to, giving extraordinary leeway to the 
interpreters. If, as argued above, the stability of the 
international monetary system calls for a circulation of SDRs in 
much larger amounts than has so far been the case, then there 
is a solid case for large new allocations. 
The limited issuances of SDRs since their creation attest to 
the fact that interpretation of such clauses have tended to not be 
so favorable. But it does not appear that a reform of the 
language is actually necessary to enable the issuance and use of 
SDRs for development or climate purposes. After all, 
acknowledging that the Fund’s governing bodies are masters of 
the interpretations of these provisions in ways that may, in 
some instances, disturbingly affect their substance, is today a 
common phenomenon across many international 
organizations.112 
There is one reason that may justify a legal reform to 
establish the possibility of issuing SDRs for development or 
climate finance: in order to enable subjecting such issuances to 
differentiated rules with regards to interest and service charges. 
As explained, members attempting to exchange SDRs face a net 
charge.113 As small as it may be for some holders, compared to 
their cost of borrowing hard currency in international markets, 
it can become significant for very poor countries. In these cases, 
a subsidization of the interest charges—for instance through 
grants or through a slightly higher interest paid by other 
 
 110. See IMF Articles art. XVIII(1)(a). 
 111. See Montek Singh Ahluwalia, SDR Allocations and the Present Articles 
of Agreement, in THE FUTURE OF THE SDR IN THE LIGHT OF CHANGES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 88–95 (Michael Mussa et al. eds., 1996) 
(detailing the ambiguities in the language of the IMF Articles of Agreement 
(even if not going as far as the argument contained in this paragraph)). 
 112. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-
MAKERS, 521–69 (2005) (providing an in-depth account of the trend of 
interpretations affecting substance); id. at 600 (“[International Organizations] 
have also blurred the distinctions between making law, interpreting it and 
adjudicating it.”). 
 113. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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members—may be an acceptable solution. This would make sure 
that SDRs directed to development or climate finance purposes 
do not have their ends frustrated. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper argued that there are four acute challenges that 
reform proposals to the monetary system should be able to 
address. The first challenge is to foster an orderly exit from the 
global imbalances. The second challenge is to reduce currency 
volatility, with its consequent negative implications for trade 
flows. The third is to achieve a mechanism for more symmetric 
adjustments between surplus and deficit countries, while 
avoiding recessionary impacts and preserving aggregate 
demand. Finally, the fourth challenge is to assess the growing 
needs for development and climate finance in a post-crisis 
world. 
It was argued that some of the reform proposals could be 
introduced without revising the existing legal framework —as 
embodied in the IMF Articles of Agreement. However, in order 
to adopt a number of reforms that are required to adequately 
respond to such challenges, the current legal framework is no 
longer adequate. This is particularly the case for the principles 
and provisions surrounding the roles of the US dollar and the 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in the global reserve system 
envisioned in the 1960s. 
 
 
